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*Crim. L.R. 368 Summary: This article offers an analysis of the creation of statutory powers to allow
witnesses to give evidence anonymously. The latest provisions are those in the Coroners and Justice
Act 2009 replacing the emergency temporary legislation: Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act
2008. Consideration is given to that Act, its legislative history and case law. Examination of the new
powers for investigation anonymity orders suggests that these are likely to be of symbolic rather than
practical significance.
Introduction
The debate about the circumstances in which it may be permissible for the Crown to secure a
conviction based on the evidence of an anonymous witness engages issues which are numerous,
complex and controversial. These include: the need to secure evidence in serious cases in which
increasingly commonly witnesses are unwilling to provide evidence for fear of reprisals1 ; the need to
protect witnesses and their rights to security and privacy; the disadvantages faced by the defendant
and whether these render the process so unfair as to deny the accused a fair trial; the extent to which
defendants can claim a right to “confront” their accuser and whether this is infringed; whether a
process can be designed to ensure sufficient safeguards for the rights of the defendant and the
witness.
*Crim. L.R. 369 The potential disadvantages to the defendant are significant and substantial: it is
impossible to investigate fully the credibility of the anonymous witness; the defendant is worse off
than if hearsay is adduced against him or her; the defendant has no opportunity to assess the
demeanour of the witness; the defendant's cross-examination is less likely to be effective; the
defendant's ability to examine witnesses is unequal to the Crown's; there is a potential conflict with
art.6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); there is no opportunity to confront
the witnesses; the defendant is more reliant than normal on the disclosure process; the defendant's
relationship with his or her counsel may be put under strain where counsel alone sees the witness;
the jury may be likely to treat the use of anonymous witness evidence as implicit evidence that the
accused is violent and/or responsible for intimidation. The witness denied anonymity faces at worst a
risk to life, at minimum a loss of respect for privacy. The issue is not, of course, one of “balancing” the
respective rights; it is a question of when the defendant's right to a fair trial ought to be qualified to
protect witnesses' rights (as guaranteed in arts 2, 3, 5 and 8 ECHR).2
While the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has made significant inroads into the hearsay rule so that more
evidence can be received from absent witnesses including those in fear (s.116(2)(e)), such witnesses
are only spared the need to attend the trial and face the accused and his associates; there is no
protection of identity. Equally, while in recent years there has been a greater awareness of the
difficulties facing a witness giving evidence and the use of special measures to alleviate the stress of
testifying is more commonplace,3 these do nothing to protect witnesses or their families outside the
courtroom.
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This article considers Chs 1 and 2 of Pt 3 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Chapter 2 will be
examined in detail while Ch.1, which is likely to be of less significance in practice, will be treated in
outline only. The discussion will commence with a consideration of the decision of the House of Lords
in Davis, 4 which led to the enactment of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 and,
eventually, Ch.2 of Pt 3 of the 2009 Act.
From Davis to the 2009 Act: a brief history
Davis
Davis was convicted of the murders of AK and WM at a party at which Davis admitted being present
but claimed to have left before the shooting. Three prosecution witnesses identified Davis as the
gunman. To protect their identity, the judge ordered that they would be allowed to give evidence
under pseudonyms; any details which might identify them were to be withheld from Davis and his
legal advisers; they would be allowed to give evidence from behind screens; their voices *Crim. L.R.
370 would be disguised electronically; and when testifying they could not be asked any questions
which might lead to their identification. Davis suspected that the evidence was procured by an
ex-girlfriend.
Dismissing his appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected Davis's contention that the protective measures
adopted at trial were in conflict with the common law and inconsistent with art.6 ECHR. The House of
Lords, however, unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that, in cases in
which anonymity was preserved in full and the defendant had no opportunity to investigate the
credibility of the witness against him, the defendant's right to a fair trial was infringed if the evidence
was the sole or decisive evidence against him. In this case, the anonymous witness evidence was the
sole or decisive basis for Davis's conviction. In addition, the anonymity prevented effective
cross-examination. Davis's defence, which went to the probity and credibility of the witnesses, was
gravely impeded by his counsel's inability to explore who the witnesses were and the nature of their
contact with Davis.
The 2008 Act
The decision of the House of Lords was handed down on June 18, 2008. Within days of the decision,
multi-handed murder trials had collapsed.5 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) revealed that
around 580 cases had anonymity orders operating/pending (of which 290 involved test purchases by
undercover officers, 40 involved other police witnesses and 50 involved members of the public).6 The
Government swiftly announced proposals for “emergency” temporary legislation that would empower
courts to make “witness anonymity orders”. The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill had
cross-party support in both Houses. Despite dealing with issues of enormous gravity it received only
one day of debate in the House of Commons. By July 21, 2008 the Criminal Evidence (Witness
Anonymity) Act 20087 was in force, and the Attorney General had produced complementary
guidelines on the use of anonymous witnesses: The Prosecutor's Role in Applications for Witness
Anonymity Orders. 8
At a subsequent Public Bill Committee hearing, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Keir
Starmer Q.C., shared statistics gathered from the early operation of the 2008 Act. He explained that
the police had to pass an application to the CPS to help ensure the measures did not become routine.
Any proposed application was considered only by unit or division heads who had *Crim. L.R. 371 “to
personally sign off” the application before it was made.9 Starmer's figures were from July until
December 2008, by which time 137 cases had passed to the CPS for consideration--an average of 20
per month.10 These cases involved 346 witnesses in total, making an average of almost two per day
requesting anonymity during that period.11 Only if the police take anonymity seriously will the
procedure remain exceptional, and these statistics cast doubt on that. Starmer clarified that
applications were made in respect of 135 out of the 346 witnesses--less than 40 per cent--and of
those 129 were granted; this suggests that the CPS was selecting the right cases to take forward.12
The DPP also explained that only 43 cases involved civilian witnesses, whilst the rest involved police
witnesses.13 When the statistics are dissected this way they appear less worrying, although arguably
they add very considerable weight to suggestions that there should be separate provisions dealing
with civilian and police witnesses, as is the case in New Zealand.14 The six unsuccessful applications,
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all involving civilians, were rejected because “the witness did not add sufficiently to the prosecution
case to warrant … an order”.15 Overall it is not surprising the DPP was satisfied with the “high success
rate” in applications made and had confidence in the statutory safeguards.16 The figures suggest the
provisions are clearly capable of being understood and applied by the CPS to filter out cases where
an order is unlikely to be granted. More recent statistics support this analysis. Between July 2008 and
December 31, 2009, the total number of witnesses for whom police requested the CPS to consider
applying for an order was 717 (civilian 193: undercover non-test purchase law enforcement officer:
211; test purchase officer: 280; other (interpreters etc: 33). Some 55 of these requests were rejected
by the CPS as untenable. The total number of applications granted by the courts in that period was
343 (civilian 69, undercover officer 144, test purchase officer 117, other 13). The total number of
applications refused by the courts was 26 (21 civilians and 5 undercover officers).17
As noted, the introduction of a separate, streamlined regime for law enforcement officers may have
much to commend it. Furthermore, many cases involving applications in respect of police officer
witnesses are likely to result in guilty pleas without any witnesses giving evidence, anonymously or
otherwise. Better judicial case management in cases that involve police officer witnesses only would
assist by forcing the parties to address the issue at plea and case management hearing without the
need for a formal application at that stage of the procedure.
*Crim. L.R. 372 It is interesting to note that although there are clearly hundreds of cases in which
witness anonymity orders are being made, only a handful have resulted in reported appeals.18 In part,
the paucity of appeals may reflect the successful drafting of the legislation. In part, it may be a
reflection of the Court of Appeal's clear and comprehensive commentary on the Act offered in the first
case it considered--Mayers, 19 in which Mayers' appeal was conjoined with those in three other cases:
Glasgow ; Bahmanzadeh and Costelloe ; and V, P and R. It is submitted that the court's guidance on
the 2008 Act remains pertinent given the almost identical terms in which the relevant provisions of the
2009 Act have been enacted.
More cynically, one might question whether the paucity of appeals reflects the fact that the courts
were already adept at dealing fairly with anonymity orders at common law before the House of Lords
curtailed that possibility. The Act simply gave the courts a new structure and the seal of parliamentary
approval to a process that already operated well in practice. In Powar, 20 for example, the Court of
Appeal affirmed that the trial judge had acted fairly in granting pre-2008 Act witness anonymity orders
to six individuals who had witnessed a murder from their houses. The court displayed its pre-Act
disposition towards anonymity; emphasising that “the intimidation of witnesses has become an ugly
feature of contemporary life”, it suggested that the use of witness anonymity orders should not be
limited to the most extreme cases,21 but rejected the argument that the provisions should be restricted
to cases involving terrorism or gangland killings. In Glasgow (an appeal conjoined with Mayers ), the
Court of Appeal was again satisfied that the trial judge had thoroughly addressed the pre-conditions
for making a witness anonymity order before the statutory framework was in place.22
The 2009 Act 23
Section 14 of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 provided for the expiration of the
Act on December 31, 2009, with the Government promising that its temporary emergency provisions
would be replaced by more carefully considered ones. In the event, however, Ch.2 of Pt 3 of the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 essentially re-enacts the key provisions of the 2008 Act wholesale
with only a few very minor differences. Again, it might be argued that the lack of significant change
made to the 2008 Act after time for considered reflection and parliamentary scrutiny is an indication
that the provisions are working well. However, there is no doubt that difficult issues remain for the
courts, including in particular the ECHR compatibility of the process. This is considered below, after
the provisions of Ch.2, *Crim. L.R. 373 which have been in force from January 1, 2010,24 have been
examined in more detail. The provisions apply to England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Witness anonymity orders
What is a “witness anonymity order”?
This is defined in s.86(1) of the 2009 Act as,
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“… an order made by a court that requires such specified measures to be taken in relation to a
witness in criminal proceedings as the court considers appropriate to ensure that the identity of the
witness is not disclosed in or in connection with the proceedings”.
By s.86(2), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken include measures for securing the
withholding of the witness's name and other identifying details from disclosure; the use of a
pseudonym; the prevention of questions that might lead to the witness's identification; the screening
of the witness; and the modulation of the witness's voice. These are merely examples of the types of
measures that may be taken, drawing on experience from the orders made under the common law
pre-Davis and listed by Lord Carswell in his speech in Davis. 25 There is therefore a wide judicial
discretion. The types of protection applied for may require careful thought, particularly where there
are numerous witnesses. For example, a request for voice modulation in relation to only one witness
might lead the accused to suspect that that witness is known to him or her, or has a distinctive
voice/accent, rendering it more likely that that witness's protection will be undermined.
Significantly, s.86(4)(a) prevents an order being made which screens a witness from “the judge or
other members of the court (if any), or … the jury (if there is one)”.26 In addition, if voice modulation is
used, the witness's natural voice must still be heard by these individuals (s.86(4)(b)). As at common
law, the judge and jury see and hear the witness in his or her natural state, thus maximising their
opportunity to evaluate the witness's demeanour.27 The provisions are silent as to whether the legal
representatives may see the witness: presumably the trial judge will allow this if the advocate so
chooses (in Davis, counsel had declined the opportunity to see any witness his client was forbidden
from seeing).28
The provisions have no part to play where the witness is known to the defendant but the witness
seeks to avoid his or her name being revealed to the public.29 Interestingly, in Powar, 30 the fact that
there was inadvertent disclosure to the *Crim. L.R. 374 defence of documents as to who the
anonymous witness was did not justify the lifting of the order,31 nor did the failure in that case and in
Nazir 32 of the voice modulation system. In both instances it was arguable that the true force of the
protection had already been lost and the witnesses' identities were being shielded from the public
only.
Orders are available in “criminal proceedings” in the Crown Court, Criminal Division of the Court of
Appeal and the magistrates' court (s.97(1)(a)). Orders in the magistrates' court are expected,
however, to be very rare, their availability being retained principally because of drug prosecutions
involving test purchases tried there.33 Notably, orders may not be made in the High Court. While it
may be unlikely for cases requiring consideration of such orders to arise in the High Court, this court
does have an important role to play in respect of judicial review of magistrates' decisions.
No specific offence is created for breach of an order, but such conduct constitutes a contempt of
court. The common law rules relating to public interest immunity are unaffected (s.95). Although there
is no specific power of appeal against the making of an order, the powers under s.58 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 for prosecution interlocutory appeals apply,34 but the defence will only have an
interlocutory appeal in preparatory hearings. It should be noted however that the Court of Appeal has
indicated that interlocutory appeals on witness anonymity decisions ought not to be made35 since the
court is not well placed before the trial is even underway to assess the criteria in the Act and the
extent to which the defendant is affected.
Under s.91 of the 2009 Act, a witness anonymity order made in relation to any criminal proceedings
may in those proceedings subsequently be varied, further varied or discharged where it appears
“appropriate” to the court that made it. This may be on the court's own motion or on application by any
party if a material change in circumstances has occurred since the order wasmade or varied. The
2009 Act also makes provision in s.92 for discharge or variation after the proceedings have ended,
and in s.93 for discharge or variation by an appeal court.36
The application procedure 37
Section 87 regulates the procedure for making an application for a witness anonymity order.38 It
re-enacts the provision in the 2008 Act. Despite Government amendments inserted to provide a more
detailed system, the provision was one of *Crim. L.R. 375 the most controversial clauses in the 2008
Bill. The procedural provisions were designed to meet the ECHR concerns, as examined by Lord
Mance in Davis, 39 but these provisions have attracted the criticism that the procedure enacted offers
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inadequate protection for defendants.
Section 87(2) provides that, on an application by the prosecutor, the identity of the witness may be
withheld from any other party to the proceedings before and during the application, but must (unless
the court directs otherwise40 ) be revealed to the court. There may be cases involving national security
where even the court does not insist on knowing the identity of the witness, although (in accordance
with s.86(4)) the witness will be heard and seen by the judge in any event.
All applications made by the prosecution will be governed by the Attorney General's Guidelines and
DPP's Guidance. The Attorney General's Guidelines require that an application will only be authorised
at an appropriately high level:
“The role of the prosecutor as an independent and impartial minister of justice is of paramount
importance. Applications should only be authorised by prosecutors at an appropriately senior level
within the prosecuting authority.”41
Under the DPP's Guidance this authorisation must be given specifically by the Head of the Complex
Casework Unit or the Head of HQ Casework Division.42 Additionally, the Attorney General's
Guidelines provide that a prosecution application may only be made where there are genuine grounds
to believe that the court would not otherwise hear evidence which it is in the interests of justice for it to
hear.43 These additional procedural safeguards seek to prevent misuse of powers which obviously
have the potential to place defendants at significant disadvantage. The importance of the Crown
conducting a thorough investigation of any potential witness is underlined by the fact that, in Mayers,
the court allowed only one of the four conjoined appeals. The conviction that was found to be unsafe
was one with numerous unusual factors, not least of which was that the anonymous witness had
come to light late, thus denying a proper opportunity for her credibility to be assessed, particularly in
view of her long list of previous convictions.44 She was known to the victim's family, and aspects of
her evidence contradicted that of independent witnesses who were not providing identification
evidence.45 The court considered that it was abundantly clear that this witness should not have been
made the subject of an order. This serves as a reminder of why witness anonymity orders should be
used sparingly,46 the DPP's Guidance suggesting only where “absolutely necessary”.47 As in any case
involving sensitive information, the prosecution may decide that if the court is not prepared to protect
the source, the prosecution should not be pursued. In this context, the prosecution will be acutely
aware of the duty owed to the witness. If the application is unlikely to succeed, but in simply making
*Crim. L.R. 376 it there is an increased risk to the life or safety of the witness, that may deter an
application.
A very different procedure applies on application by a defendant. The identity of the witness must be
revealed to the court and to the prosecutor, but not to any other defendant (if any) (s.87(3)). Concerns
were raised in parliamentary debates that the inequality between the procedure for the defence and
the Crown gave rise to unfairness and potential conflict with the ECHR, in particular art.6(3)(d) which
provides that the defendant has the right to examine witnesses against him “under the same
conditions as witnesses” on his behalf. The practical justification for the requirement that D reveal the
identity of the witness he or she wishes to keep anonymous to the Crown is that, unless D1 does so,
the Crown cannot investigate that witness and fulfil its disclosure obligations to D2. However, defence
applications are also available in single defendant trials, and the same obligation to disclose the
witness's identity to the Crown applies. One obvious justification for disclosure even in such cases is
that revealing the identity of the witness is necessary if the defendant requires further prosecution
disclosure. That process could be achieved by a provision whereby D is given the option of not
disclosing the identity of the witness to the prosecution if D is content not to seek further disclosure
from the Crown. The principal reason for compulsory defence disclosure of the identity of the
proposed witness even in a single defendant case is, therefore, to enable the Crown to make inquiries
regarding the witness's credibility, and to prevent the defence from manufacturing witness accounts.
That is precisely what the defendant is not entitled to do in the converse situation. Of course, in terms
of risk of harm there is no comparison between revealing a defence witness's identity to the Crown
and a prosecution witness's to the defence. But the forensic disadvantage faced at trial by the party
seeking to cross-examine an anonymous witness is comparable.
A further potential problem is that the Act envisages that witnesses always remain true to the party for
whose case their evidence first appears supportive. In some cases, a witness who may well appear to
favour the Crown and who might be made guarantees of anonymity during the investigation may turn
out to be better suited to the defence--for example, the witness's identification evidence eventually
turns out to support D's case. What the court is to do in such circumstances is unclear. The problem
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is unlikely to be a significant one except in cases with multiple defendants where the witness's
evidence favours one defendant to the detriment of others. In addition, the question arises whether
the Crown owes a duty of care to a witness who has been made some promise of anonymity but
whose evidence turns out to favour the defence.
During the parliamentary process, numerous amendments were tabled (unsuccessfully) in attempts to
insert a requirement that “independent” or “special” counsel (as they are usually known) would be
instructed in all cases to assist the court and protect the defendant's interests. The advantages
offered by the appointment of special counsel might seem obvious given the heightened duties of
disclosure and the need for the defendant to feel confident that the duties have been fulfilled.48 Even
under the common law process in Davis special counsel was appointed. Special counsel might, for
example, appear at an ex parte hearing to *Crim. L.R. 377 determine the application for an
anonymity order and conduct a cross-examination of the potentially anonymous witness on the basis
of earlier instructions taken from the defence. Special counsel might be especially useful where the
anonymity application is inextricably linked to public interest immunity (PII) material.
One powerful argument for mandatory appointment of special counsel is that the knowledge that such
“independent” examination will occur in every case may deter prosecution and investigative agencies
from being too profligate in promising anonymity to potential witnesses.49 Such a provision would also
be welcome for increasing likely compliance with the ECHR. It gained support from the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.50 A counter argument is, of course, that appointment of
special counsel might give judges a false sense of security and lead them to be less vigilant in
scrutinising the prosecution's application. That would be undesirable.
In the 2008 Bill debates the Government remained resistant to the idea of obligatory special counsel,
arguing that the issue was too complex to be dealt with in the timeframe in which that Act had to be
passed,51 and that in any event “the court already has an inherent power” to request a special counsel
in any given case.52 The “notable omission”53 of any reference to independent counsel in the Act may
be contrasted with the position in New Zealand.54 As Howarth has pointed out, considering the
drafters deferred to New Zealand on so many issues, it is strange they did not do so here. The
Government promised to revisit the issue, but in the course of the debates on the Coroners and
Justice Bill it became apparent that there was no prospect of the inclusion of a reference to
independent counsel. While there was some pressure in this direction, Lord Kingsland maintaining,
for example, that he did not “understand why the Government are not prepared to put this matter on
the face of the Bill”,55 the Government reiterated that the Attorney General's power to appoint special
counsel, coupled with the prosecutor's duty of disclosure, afforded sufficient protection.56 It was
further emphasised that, because under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act Code of
Practice “the police are required to have explored all reasonable lines of enquiry” including “enquiries
into the witness's credibility”, there was no need for a counsel with an investigative role to become
part of the proceedings.57 Finally, it was argued that the role of the *Crim. L.R. 378 court itself must
be to test and probe the case for a witness anonymity order and as a result “the present
arrangements are adequate”.58
The Attorney General's Guidelines for prosecutors explicitly acknowledge59 that special counsel may
be applied for in the exceptional circumstances identified by the House of Lords in H. 60 However, not
all witness anonymity applications will fulfil those “exceptional” criteria. While specific reference to
special counsel in the statutory provisions might have encouraged their greater use than a mere
power to ask the Attorney General for the assistance of a special counsel, it is entirely possible that in
the early days of the new provisions special counsel may be relied on heavily when trial judges are
treading cautiously. The practical reality is that to keep special counsel to “exceptional cases” may not
be easily achievable.
In Davis the House of Lords held that,
“… fairness of a trial should not largely depend on the diligent performance of their duties by the
prosecuting authorities. All are familiar with notorious cases in which wrongful convictions have
resulted from police malpractice, rare though such misconduct is.”61
Despite parliamentary consideration of the position in the course of preparing the 2008 and 2009
Acts, the fairness of the provisions seems very largely to depend on the scrupulously fair operation of
the disclosure process by the prosecution. The appointment of special counsel is one obvious way in
which such scrupulous fairness can be maintained.
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The opportunity for ex parte procedures is governed by s.87(6) and (7). The Explanatory Notes to the
Act describe these as reflecting “existing practice” for ex parte prosecution applications, “with the
defence able to make representations later at a hearing with the prosecution (and possibly other
defendants) present”. In contrast, it is “expected that defence applications will be permitted without
other defendants being present but will always be made in the presence of the prosecution”.62
Necessary conditions for an anonymity order
The heart of the scheme lies in ss.88 and 89 of the 2009 Act. An order may only be made subject to
the three conditions in s.88. The court must be “satisfied” of each of these conditions in every case,
but this is not a formal requirement that the matter be proved to the criminal standard, and
presumably the judge may be satisfied by evidence which would be inadmissible at trial. It is at least
arguable whether the trial judge can make the decision on the basis of PII material alone which the
defence has no opportunity to challenge or know about.63 Even if all three conditions are met there is
no obligation to grant an anonymity order.
*Crim. L.R. 379 Condition A By s.88(3), “Condition A” is that the proposed order is necessary,
“(a) in order to protect the safety of the witness or another person or to prevent any serious damage
to property, or
(b) in order to prevent real harm to the public interest (whether affecting the carrying on of any
activities in the public interest or the safety of a person involved in carrying on such activities, or
otherwise)”.
The court must make a finding of fact under Condition A and therefore the party seeking the order
must bear a burden of satisfying the judge. A voir dire may well be necessary. In Nazir, 64 the Court of
Appeal upheld a trial judge's order made at common law where the judge had conducted a voir dire
hearing from the witness in person to establish the reason for refusing to testify without anonymity.
Although the court must be “satisfied” that the proposed order is “necessary” to protect the witness,
given the open-ended language of s.88, it can be argued that Condition A will be too readily met.
Under s.88(3)(b), it is sufficient that the court is satisfied that there will be real harm to the public
interest even if no need for protection of a person or property from harm is shown. This provision has
been described as “hopelessly vague”.65 It may be enough under s.88(3)(b) that any undercover
officers claim simply that without anonymity they will not be able to work in that role again. This
triggers the possibility that blanket applications may be made in respect of certain types of officer. The
Court of Appeal in Bahmanzadeh and Costelloe (conjoined with Mayers ),66 considering the 2008 Act,
acknowledged an obvious public interest in maintaining the anonymity of law enforcement officers
involved in undercover operations and that a judge would normally be entitled to follow the
unequivocal assertion by such an officer that he would not give evidence without an anonymity order.
The court dismissed the appeal because the identities of the witnesses “were irrelevant to the issues
before the jury”, making the witness anonymity orders fair.67 The anonymised witnesses were
undercover police officers and so it was held that their anonymity “was necessary to prevent real
harm to the public interest”.68 We submit that whether anonymity for undercover officers will always be
necessary in the public interest requires further clarification. To take such a view might well be
justified given the difficulties in recruiting officers for this type of work; the nature, extent and expense
of the training they are required to undertake; the psychological assessments to which they are
subjected; and the selection process which ensures that rigorous integrity checks are undertaken.
Serious doubts might also be raised as to whether it can be “necessary”, as s.88(3)(a) contemplates,
to grant anonymity merely to prevent serious damage to *Crim. L.R. 380 property (without serious
injury), albeit that there must be a serious risk of serious damage.69 Section 88(6) provides further
guidance, requiring the court to,
“… have regard (in particular) to any reasonable fear on the part of the witness--
(a) that the witness or another person would suffer death or injury, or
(b) that there would be serious damage to property,
if the witness were to be identified”.
That does not impose formal requirements that the witness fears death or serious injury before
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Condition A is satisfied. Nor is there any requirement that the defendant is the direct cause of the
fear.70 Many witnesses of serious or organised criminal activity will experience fear generated merely
by the circumstances of the crime: will judges readily accept them as “reasonable” fears? The courts
will have to take a rigorous approach to Condition A if they are serious about limiting anonymity to
“exceptional” cases.
The necessity requirement is clearly an objective test, and the requirement of reasonable fear is a
mixed subjective-and-objective test: the witness must be in fear and have reasonable grounds for
being so.71
Condition B By s.88(4), “Condition B” is that the judge is satisfied that, “having regard to all the
circumstances, the effect of the proposed order would be consistent with the defendant receiving a
fair trial”. This is a provision designed to ensure ECHR compatibility. The Government was confident
of compatibility, and the present DPP, in a former role, was also confident that the “Convention does
not rule out the use of anonymous witnesses”.72 The court in Mayers was pleased to find that
Condition B reinforced the idea “that a safe conviction cannot be produced by an unfair trial”.73 The
Government might be accused of having passed the buck to the trial judge to ensure art.6 fairness by
leaving it to his or her judgment on a case-by-case basis. Of course, it might be argued that, in doing
so, the Government adopted the least interventionist role. If it had made specific statutory provision
that limited the discretion of the courts, it would no doubt have been accused of politicising the issue.
It is simpler to leave the judge in charge of deciding what constitutes a “fair trial” in each case.
However, the provision could have been drafted more strictly since the judge is obliged in every case
to be “satisfied” only that the measure would be “consistent” with the defendant having a fair trial.
Could a distinction be drawn between an order “consistent with” and an order “not in contravention
of”? Furthermore, having regard to this provision, some might question whether the House of Lords'
denunciation of the common law in Davis has had any real effect. Would any of the trial judges who
made orders pre-Davis really have done so if they were not sure the defendant could have a fair trial?
*Crim. L.R. 381 Condition C By s.88(5), the judge must be satisfied,
“… that the importance of the witness's testimony is such that in the interests of justice the witness
ought to testify and--
(a) the witness would not testify if the proposed order were not made, or
(b) there would be real harm to the public interest if the witness were to testify without the proposed
order being made”.74
Section 88(5)(b) was presumably inserted to preclude an argument that police officers and security
service personnel would not satisfy the test in s.88(5)(a) because they would be under a duty to
testify and could not (readily) refuse to testify.
It remains unclear how a court would determine the interests of justice requirement. Is that to be left
as an open-textured discretion? What factors will be relevant? It may well be relevant, for example, to
consider how much other evidence is available, the significance of the evidence in question, and the
gravity of the offence.
Mandatory considerations In considering whether Conditions A-C are met, the court must have regard
to the considerations set out in s.89 and to any other matters which the court considers relevant.
Although these are fact-specific, all of the considerations should be addressed. The court in Mayers
was satisfied with the list of mandatory considerations contained in what is now s.89(2) of the 2009
Act.75 These are:
“(a) the general right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to know the identity of a witness in the
proceedings”.
This is nothing more than a reminder to the court of the general right to know the identity of the
accuser.
“(b) the extent to which the credibility of the witness concerned would be a relevant factor when the
weight of his or her evidence comes to be assessed”.
This was a very important factor in the decision in Davis. The inability to challenge the credit of the
witness is one of the main reasons that the cross-examination is less effective in an anonymous
witness case. The important distinction between reliability and credibility is emphasised in the DPP's
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Guidance. 76
“(c) whether evidence given by the witness might be the sole or decisive evidence implicating the
defendant”.
The specific obligation in s.89(2)(c) to have regard to whether the witness's evidence is the sole or
decisive evidence implicating the defendant was introduced by the Government to meet the specific
concerns raised by the House of Lords in Davis about ECHR compatibility. It does not go as far as
some amendments tabled *Crim. L.R. 382 in Parliament which proposed a formal corroboration
requirement.77 Whether the evidence is “sole or decisive” is only a consideration and not a condition
for the granting of an order, but the scope of its application is far from clear. The court in Mayers
observed that, whilst it did not of itself preclude a witness anonymity order, it directly impinged on
whether Condition B had been met, because if the evidence of a witness was either the sole or
decisive evidence it was unlikely this condition would be fulfilled.78 This explanation will undoubtedly
be important as an aid to future interpretations of the 2009 Act on this controversial issue.
In its recent landmark decision in Horncastle, 79 the UK Supreme Court noted, in confirming that there
is no rule that hearsay evidence cannot constitute the sole or decisive prosecution evidence, that it
may be difficult, if there were such a rule, to determine in a particular case whether hearsay evidence
constitutes the “decisive” evidence against the defendant:
“The judge will have to rule inadmissible any witness statement capable of proving ‘decisive’. This will
be no easy task … If ‘decisive’ means capable of making the difference between a finding of guilt and
innocence, then all hearsay evidence will have to be excluded.”80
The Supreme Court in Horncastle also noted that:
“Where the witness is … present but anonymous, the [2008 Act] provide[s] … safeguards … against
the risk that the use of the witness' evidence will render the verdict unsafe and the trial unfair.”81
This suggests that the Supreme Court would be sympathetic to the following position advanced in the
Attorney General's Guidelines :
“Anonymous witness testimony is not necessarily incompatible with Article 6, even when it is the sole
or decisive evidence against the accused. But whether the measures used to allow a witness to give
evidence anonymously in any particular case would make the trial unfair has to be evaluated with
care on the facts of each case.”82
This issue is discussed further below.
“(d) whether the witness's evidence could be properly tested (whether on grounds of credibility or
otherwise) without his or her identity being disclosed”.
The judge must attempt to assess this in light of the disclosure material he has seen in respect of the
witness and on his anticipation of what the defence case will be. An accurate and fair assessment
depends on the prosecution revealing sufficient detail for the judge. The prosecution ought to disclose
to the defence as much detail as *Crim. L.R. 383 is compatible with anonymity for the defence to
make some effective challenge to credibility wherever possible. In Nazir, 83 for example, the Crown
revealed to the defence that the witness was an illegal immigrant and that her credibility might
therefore be challenged on that basis. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Mayers, when
considering the 2008 Act, the prosecution must be pro-active in focusing on the credibility of a witness
and the interests of justice. It is not enough for the prosecution to excuse its failings by pointing to a
defence statement which lacks the necessary detail. Despite such pronouncements, what cannot be
ignored is the significance that the disclosure process will have on the fair application of the
anonymity orders. In practice, the provisions surely increase the pressure on the defence to provide
greater detail in a defence statement.84
“(e) whether there is any 85 reason to believe that the witness --
(i) has a tendency to be dishonest, or
(ii) has any motive to be dishonest in the circumstances of the case,
having regard (in particular) to any previous convictions of the witness and to any relationship
between the witness and the defendant or any associates of the defendant”.
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Read literally, the judge is to consider “any reasonable grounds for a belief”. This is extremely wide.
The court might also consider, for example, whether the witness has any interest in the outcome of
the case, whether the witness was known to the defendant before the incident in question, and
whether there is any independent evidence supporting the witness's account.
“(f) whether it would be reasonably practicable to protect the witness by any means other than by
making a witness anonymity order specifying the measures that are under consideration by the court”.
This is self-explanatory. The court in Mayers was satisfied that the Government's position on witness
relocation was correct: it is “a practicable alternative in the rarest of circumstances”.86
Section 89(2) is looser than its New Zealand equivalent, which requires the court also to have regard
to “the principle that witness anonymity orders are justified only in exceptional circumstances”,87 “the
gravity of the offence” 88 and “whether there is other evidence that corroborates the witness's
evidence”.89 The Joint Committee on Human Rights unsuccessfully advocated the inclusion of the first
two considerations in the Bill in 2008.90 Whilst it is understandable if not *Crim. L.R. 384
commendable for Parliament to reject a corroboration requirement as introducing too much restriction
and complexity, leaving out a statutory requirement that anonymity should be exceptional was
arguably a significant failing, and sent the wrong message to prosecutors.
Assessing the factors in s.89(2) will be no easy task and necessarily involves speculation. The court
must have “regard to” (not be “satisfied” of) this nonexhaustive list of factors. In the context of hearsay
under s.114(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the test of “having regard to” has been held not to
require the trial judge to investigate all the factors in every case.91
As emphasised by the House of Lords in Davis, the significant impediment in not knowing the identity
of the witness is that the party cannot challenge his or her credibility either generally or in relation to
the matters in issue. Section 89(2) seeks to underline the significance of credibility in paras (b) and
(e). Recognition of their heightened importance was demonstrated by the fact that amendments were
tabled (albeit unsuccessfully) to elevate para.(e) from a “mere” factor to be considered in what is now
s.89 to an essential condition under s.88.92 Paragraph (e) may well prove troublesome in practice. If
the defendant does not know who the witness is, it is difficult for him or her to provide the court with
material or even, for example, arguments as to why that witness does have a tendency to be
dishonest. Once again, the defendant is at the mercy of the disclosure regime and the ability of the
judge to anticipate from material disclosed any likely motives the witness may have.
In sum, in ss.88 and 89 the Government has sought to build into the process numerous safeguards,
drawing on the practice at common law, the suggestions in Lord Carswell's speech in the House of
Lords in Davis, and the New Zealand Act. Although not incorporating every one of the possible
safeguards, it is submitted that the party seeking the grant of an order under the Act will face no less
onerous an obligation than at common law.
Jury warnings
On a trial on indictment with a jury, the judge must warn appropriately to prevent prejudice to the
defendant from the anonymity order being followed.93 Specimen directions have been drafted by the
Judicial Studies Board.94 In Mayers and in Nazir the trial judges' directions were found to be perfectly
satisfactory.95
Investigation anonymity orders
Chapter 1 of Pt 3 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which deals with “investigation anonymity
orders”, will come into force on a date to be determined.96 Such orders were not provided for in the
2008 Act. The premise of such orders is that anonymity during criminal investigations might be
promised in return for information. The order itself is one made by a justice of the peace prohibiting
the disclosure of information identifying an individual as having aided an investigation *Crim. L.R.
385 into a qualifying offence.97 It is an offence for a person to disclose information in contravention of
such an order,98 and only senior figures can make applications to a justice of the peace for an order.99
In itself the scheme might sound sensible, but the provision is so hedged with qualifications that we
doubt its practical value. The Government's aimis clearly to induce victims and witnesses of “street
gangs, and gun and knife crime” to assist the police.100 A pre-condition for an order being made is a
belief on reasonable grounds that the individual “has reasonable grounds for fearing intimidation or
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harm”.101 Moreover, the orders are available only in very specific circumstances. The list of qualifying
offences is tightly drawn: the offence must be murder or manslaughter, and it must have been caused
by a firearm or knife.102 Among the matters of which the justice of the peace must also be satisfied on
reasonable grounds are “that the person likely to have committed the qualifying offence … was aged
at least 11 but under 30 at the time the offence was committed”,103 and that this person is likely to
have been a member of a group in which the majority of the members appear to have been of that
age.104 In short, these are only of value to frightened witnesses to gun and knife killings committed by
gangs of 11 to 30-year-olds.
Whether these are of anything more than symbolic value remains to be seen. The Bar Council
considers investigation anonymity orders “unlikely to be used in practice”,105 whilst JUSTICE
questions their necessity given the well-known “concept of the police informant, who can be protected
by public interest immunity proceedings”.106 The Government, however, believes that a witness
protected by an investigation anonymity order could prove invaluable, opening up new leads in an
investigation.107 Another troubling aspect of the provisions is that their focus on gang-related crime
could be easily lost; the Secretary of State can repeal or modify the pre-conditions that relate to gang
behaviour,108 and is also able to add an offence to the qualifying list or remove one from it.109 The
potential is *Crim. L.R. 386 therefore present to change completely the direction and scope of the
investigation anonymity order.
Principal principled problems
Confrontation
In Mayers, the court was quick to assert that in general the 2008 Act did not affect a number of key
principles in English criminal trials. In particular, it was asserted that the confrontation principle was
unaffected.110 This is questionable. There are a number of components to confrontation,111 one of
which, effective cross-examination, is inhibited by witness anonymity orders. A second component,
orality and openness, is likewise affected: can proceedings be said to be truly “oral” when a witness's
natural and recognisable voice is distorted? Arguably they cannot, just as the use of screens and the
suppression of a witness's identity make it difficult to claim a trial is open, regardless of how
necessary the measures were. Thirdly, confrontation requires the presence of both the witness and
the accused in court; whilst this still occurs in a literal sense, the accuser does not have to look the
accused in the eye when a witness anonymity order is in effect.
Sole or decisive evidence
Whether the evidence of the anonymous witness provides the sole or decisive evidence may well be
a crucial factor in determining the fairness of the trial. Some commentators take the view that the
provisions of the Act are incompatible with art.6 in so far as they permit reception of anonymous
witness evidence that is decisive.112 The DPP's Guidance warns that if the anonymous witness
evidence is “truly” sole or decisive it is unlikely that an application for a witness anonymity order will
be granted.113 Such a blunt assertion may be difficult to maintain in the light of the statements made in
Horncastle in the Supreme Court. Lord Phillips in Horncastle 114 observed:
“So far as a sole or decisive rule is concerned, I am not persuaded that there is a difference in
principle between its existence in relation to absent witnesses and its existence in relation to
anonymous witnesses. Each situation results in a potential disadvantage for the defendant. The
extent of that disadvantage will depend on the facts of the particular case. I cannot see why a sole or
decisive test should apply in the case of anonymous evidence but not in the case of a witness
statement. The critical question is whether, in either case, the demands of a fair trial require that a
sole or decisive test should apply regardless of the particular circumstances and, in particular,
regardless of the cogency of the evidence.”115
*Crim. L.R. 387 In V, P and R (conjoined with Mayers ) the Court of Appeal made important points
on the subject of anonymous hearsay evidence.116 The court agreed with the trial judge that the 2008
Act could not be used to allow statements by unidentified witnesses to be read in court.117 The court's
view was that the Act required that “any witness who gave oral testimony at trial, whether
anonymously, or screened, is there to be cross-examined”.118 The Supreme Court in Horncastle also
laid great emphasis on this point. It should be noted however that, technically, hearsay evidence from
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an unidentified witness may be read under ss.114(1)(d), 117 and 118(1) of the Criminal Justice Act
2003.119
In relation to sole or decisive evidence from an anonymous witness that is not also hearsay, defence
advocates might still have much to be concerned about bearing in mind the comments of the Court of
Appeal in Mayers and Powar, and the sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in Horncastle
(above). As Lord Mance noted in Davis, 120 Strasbourg has not had the final word on sole or
decisiveness. It is about to have that opportunity when the Grand Chamber hears the UK Government
challenge to the judgment in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom. 121
The position ismuch clearer and in practical terms almost impossible to challenge where the
defendant can be proved to be a cause of the need for anonymity. As Lord Carswell noted in Davis,
122 a defendant may find it difficult to argue his trial was unfair if the reason for the witnesses giving
anonymous evidence was that he or his associates had threatened them.
Conclusion
In Davis, the House of Lords refused to develop the common law even in the face of the chronic
problem of witness intimidation. Witness anonymity orders at common law were an infringement of
the fair trial process. The House openly invited Parliament to respond.123 Parliament did so swiftly.
The crucial question now is: what prevents a witness anonymity order under the 2009 Act from also
being held to infringe the defendant's right to a fair trial? The answer seems to be that although the
House of Lords was not prepared to countenance the common law producing convictions based on
evidence from anonymous witnesses, the Law Lords did not exclude the possibility that a conviction
secured in reliance on such *Crim. L.R. 388 evidence would be unfair or unsafe if sanctioned by
Parliament. The difference, and what is likely to insulate witness anonymity orders under the Act from
successful challenge, is simply that “Parliament has spoken”.
Will the provisions prove to be “the most serious single assault on liberty in living memory …
result[ing] in thousands of unfair trials”?124 Ironically, the answer lies in the hands of the same judges
from whom the House of Lords removed the powers in Davis and crucially with the prosecutors who
must act with scrupulous fairness in their role as “ministers of justice” in such cases. Whilst
jurisprudence on witness anonymity orders has not developed far yet, it is clear that a number of
important statements have already been made by the Court of Appeal. As the body of relevant case
law grows and matures, buttressing the statutory provisions, it will only serve to entrench further the
concept of witness anonymity in English criminal procedure.
Lord Denning's observation that “in the very pursuit of justice our keenness may outrun our sureness
and we may trip and fall”125 was quoted by several Parliamentarians in the course of the hasty 2008
legislative process. Disappointingly, the virtually wholesale entrenchment in “permanent” legislation of
the “temporary” provisions demonstrates that this was no temporary slip. Indeed, witness anonymity
orders are now set to be accompanied by investigation anonymity orders. The Lord Chancellor
provided assurances that the judiciary would be encouraged to monitor and record all witness
anonymity orders made under the 2008 Act so that lessons might be learned for the forthcoming
“permanent” legislation. It is unfortunate that there were no lessons that were considered to be worth
learning, other than those from the handful of decided appeals.
We are grateful to Rudi Fortson and Kingsley Hyland for comments on an earlier draft. David
Ormerod would like to thank the Criminal Bar Association and in particular Duncan Penny for
permission to use material from a lecture delivered at the Central Criminal Court in November 2008.
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